Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution by Zeidman, Steve
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research CUNY School of Law
2005
Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the
Prosecution
Steve Zeidman
CUNY School of Law
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CUNY School of Law at CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact
AcademicWorks@cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zeidman, Steve, "Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution" (2005). CUNY Academic Works.
http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cl_pubs/217
POLICING THE POLICE: THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION*
Steven Zeidman **
The Conference on New York City's Criminal Courts asked,
"Are We Achieving Justice."1 Given that those courts contended
with approximately 190,000 misdemeanor arrests in 2003, up from
130,000 in 1993, the question is increasingly relevant and
important.2
This Essay focuses on how, and whether, the component parts of
the courts-judges, court administrators, and prosecutors-pro-
mote justice by actively and critically monitoring or overseeing the
police. Police action triggers the courts' and institutional players'
opportunities to influence justice. After an accused is deposited at
the door of the court, all components of the criminal justice system
must carefully and rigorously inspect the underlying police activity.
It is time to ask whether anyone is carrying out this vital task.
This is an especially timely inquiry. While reported crime in
New York City is at its lowest level in decades,4 the number of
* This Essay is an addendum to the collection, "A Conference on New York
City's Criminal Courts," which appeared in the Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol.
XXXI, No. 4. The Conference was held October 18, 2003 and was hosted by New
York County Lawyers' Association and the Fordham University School of Law's
Louis Stein Center on Law and Ethics.
** Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law; J.D., 1981, Duke University
School of Law. For their encouragement, criticisms, and suggestions, I thank Mai
Curbelo, Tom Klein, Robert Mandelbaum, and Martha Rayner. I gratefully acknowl-
edge as well the support of the Professional Development Committee at CUNY
School of Law.
1. See generally Martha Rayner, Conference Report: New York City's Criminal
Courts: Are We Achieving Justice?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023 (2004) (discussing the
issues raised at the Criminal Courts Conference).
2. E-mail from Division of Criminal Justice Services, to author (Mar. 17, 2005,
15:55:08 EST) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinafter DCJS
e-mail].
3. While defense attorneys are very much a piece of the puzzle, and are often a
part of the problem, a detailed examination of the defense lawyer's role is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
4. See, e.g., Michele McPhee, NYPD Crime-Crunching Patrol Hike is Back,
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, at 1 ("[W]e ended 2003 with the lowest crime rate in New
York City in four decades," quoting New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg).
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misdemeanor arrests has risen dramatically. As a result, criminal
justice policy is increasingly revealed in the lower criminal court.6
Two factors are responsible for the explosion in misdemeanor
arrests. First, during the term of Mayor David Dinkins, the "Safe
Streets Safe City" initiative resulted in a marked expansion in the
size of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD").7 More
police officers created the potential for more arrests. Second, the
influence of the "Broken Windows" theory and the advent of"quality-of-life" policing under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani unleashed
that massive police force in such a way that encouraged misde-
meanor arrests for relatively minor misconduct. 9 Giuliani's initia-
tive, formally titled Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the Public
Spaces of New York, focused the police on low-level offenses such
5. In 1983, there were 105,000 misdemeanor arrests in New York City, 85,000 lessthan in 2003. DJCS e-mail, supra note 2.
6. In 1989, fifty percent of all New York City arrests were felonies. See Freda F.Solomon, N.Y. City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., The Impact of Quality-of-Life Po-licing, Research Brief No. 3, Aug. 2003 [hereinafter CJA Research Brief], available athttp://cjareports.org/reports/brief2.pdf. In 1998, that number dropped to one-third.
Id.
7. In 1991, the New York City Council and the state legislature approved the"Safe Streets, Safe City" program. 1991 N.Y. LAWS ch. 6 (McKinney 1991). The cen-terpiece of "Safe Streets, Safe City" was the addition of several thousand police of-
ficers. See Steven L. Myers, Mayor Says Crime Data Affirm Strategies, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 8, 1995, at 26 (stating that the program "raised taxes specifically to pay for thehiring of 6000 more police officers").
8. Shortly after "Safe Streets, Safe City" was enacted, the Chief Administrator ofthe New York State Courts, Matthew T. Crosson, predicted an increase in courtcaseloads. See Gary Spencer, Legislators Rule Out More Funds for Judiciary, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1991, at 1; see also John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of
Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1432 (1998) (discussing the impact of theincrease in the number of police officers on the drop in crime).
9. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the So-
cial Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998) (explaininghow New York City's quality-of-life policing, an order maintenance strategy that fo-cused on minor misdemeanor offenses, was premised on the "Broken Windows" the-ory that "minor physical and social disorder, if left unattended in a neighborhood,causes serious crime"); George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining CrimeRates: Insiders' Views of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY1217, 1218-19 (1998) (the "Broken Windows" theory "argued that, just as a brokenwindow left untended was a sign that nobody cares and leads to more and severeproperty damage, so disorderly conditions and behaviors left untended send a signalthat nobody cares and results in citizen fear of crime, serious crime, and the 'down-ward spiral of urban decay"') (quoting WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE:
CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF URBAN DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 84(1990)); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 ("[S]erious street crime flourishes in areas in which disor-
derly behavior goes unchecked.").
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as panhandling and public urination, and concomitantly gave the
green light to precinct police officers to make arrests that were for-
merly the province of specialized units.10 In short order, New York
City quality-of-life policing came to be about much more than or-
der maintenance. Then-Police Commissioner William Bratton saw
additional benefits to the enormous increase in minor offense ar-
rests-often, those arrested were carrying contraband (i.e., weap-
ons or narcotics), had outstanding warrants, or were able to
provide information about other crimes.1 ' Yet another ancillary
"benefit" served to solidify law enforcement's resolve to arrest
more and more individuals. In 1996, John Royster was arrested for
brutal attacks on four women over a period of several days. Fin-
gerprints recovered at one of the crime scenes matched those taken
from Royster when he was arrested three months earlier for jump-
ing the turnstile.' 2 The result was the complete transformation of
quality-of-life, Broken Windows order maintenance policing into"zero tolerance" for any offense.' 3 No longer were the police
targeting low-level offenses to restore social order; instead, their
modus operandi was to catch more serious criminals.' 4 The moti-
vation to arrest even more people grew accordingly. 5 As one
10. See, e.g., Al Baker, NYPD Unveils Plans to Pad Street Patrol, DAILY NEWS,
Jul. 6, 1994, at 8 ("To all the cops who've claimed they've been handcuffed for years,
we're saying, 'We're taking the cuffs off so you can go put them on someone else.'");
Matthew Purdy, In New York, the Handcuffs are One-Size-Fits-All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 1997, at 1 ("The police had become specialists .... Narcotics officers made drug
arrests. Morals squad officers arrested prostitutes. Under Mayor Giuliani, all officers
were empowered to attack all crimes. Officers suddenly had wide leeway to act.").
11. See George L. Kelling, How to Run a Police Department, CITY JOURNAL, Au-
tumn 1995, at 34 ("seemingly inconsequential lawbreakers often turned out to be car-
rying illegal weapons," and also were potential sources of information about other
crimes); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force-Why Patrick Dorismond didn't have to die,
NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at 24 ("[O]ne in seven fare beaters had arrest warrants
outstanding .... "); Jackson Toby, Reducing Crime: New York's Example, WASHING-
TON POST, Jul. 23, 1996, at A17 (noting that a substantial number of those arrested for
subway fare evasion were carrying weapons or had pending warrants).
12. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum et al., Justice Was Just a Turnstile Away, DAILY
NEWS, June 14, 1996, at 4.
13. Jim Dwyer, Cops are Really Tixing Us Off, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 15, 1996, at 8
(describing people being given summonses for having an unlicensed bake sale, failing
to have a bell on a bicycle, and taking up more than one seat on an empty subway
train).
14. For a trenchant analysis of the NYPD's metamorphosis from Broken Windows
to zero tolerance policing, see Rosen, supra note 11 ("Once the police began thinking
of low-level public disorder not as a problem to be addressed but as an opportunity to
investigate more serious crime, the incentive to arrest citizens for relatively minor
offenses dramatically increased.").
15. Id.
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scholar observed succinctly, "'Never before have so many been ar-
rested for so little.""' 6 The increased interactions between police
and individuals was felt most by young black and Latino men,17
and complaints of police abuse and brutality rose by almost fifty
percent.18
The spike in misdemeanor arrests, especially for low-level of-
fenses, is not the only warning sign that such cases demand careful
examination. The proliferation of DNA exonerations of previously
convicted individuals provides incontrovertible proof that many
defendants are actually innocent and/or wrongly convicted. 9 A re-
cent study of exonerations in murder and rape cases "suggests that
there are thousands of innocent people in prison today," and that''many innocent people have been convicted of less serious
crimes."20
The disparate impact of the present policing on people of color
has also been well documented. In 1999, the shooting of Amadou
Diallo by four police officers focused attention on the behavior of
the NYPD's Street Crimes Unit ("SCU").2 ' SCU was primarily
concerned with finding illegal handguns. In 1998, the year before
the Diallo shooting, SCU reported stopping and frisking 27,061
people, of whom only 4647 were arrested. Put another way, nearly
22,000 people were mistakenly or improperly searched.22 After an
16. Today's News: Update, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 11, 1996, at 1 (quoting Professor An-
drew Karmen of John Jay College of Criminal Justice paraphrasing Winston Churc-
hill's salute to the Royal Air Force for its efforts during the Battle of Britain, "Never
in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" (THE COLUM-
BIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS, at http://www.bartleby.com/66/75/12375.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2005)).
17. See Rosen, supra note 11 ("Zero tolerance focuses not on deterring crime but
on discovering it-by mandating that police stop, frisk and arrest vast numbers of
young black and Hispanic men for minor offenses .... ").
18. See James S. Kunen, Quality and Equality, NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 1994, at 10.19. See, e.g., JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 262-67 (2000); Alan Berlow,
The wrong man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999; Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of
Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635 (1999); Richard A. Rosen,
Innocence & Death, 82 N.C. L. REv. 61, 65-78 (2003); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumen-
thal, New Doubt Cast on Crime Testing in Houston Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at
A19 (DNA exoneration of man convicted of rape called into question the scientific
evidence used to convict thousands). For a discussion of the distinction between ac-
tual innocence and convictions obtained due to significant legal error see Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346 (1997).
20. Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2004, at A15.
21. See Weekend of Progress in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at A20.
22. Michael Cooper, Raids and Complaints Rise as City Draws on Drug Tips, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1998, at Al.
318
POLICING THE POLICE
exhaustive examination of the NYPD's "stop and frisk '23 practices,
the New York State Attorney General reported that blacks and
Latinos disproportionately bore the brunt of this aggressive polic-
ing.24 The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board
("CCRB") examined NYPD "stop and frisk" activity by reviewing
complaints filed by people who had been stopped on the street and
frisked by a police officer. 25  The CCRB found that "African-
Americans were over-represented in this sample of street-stop
complaints, while whites were underrepresented. 26
In January 2000, the NYPD implemented a narcotics enforce-
ment initiative called "Operation Condor. ' 27 Two months later,
Patrick Dorismond was approached by an undercover Condor of-
23. "Stop and frisk" refers to the practice condoned by the United States Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). According to Terry, a police officer may
stop someone if he reasonably suspects the person has committed or is about to com-
mit a crime. Id. at 23. The officer can frisk or "pat down" the person if he reasonably
suspects he is in danger of physical injury. Id. at 24.
24. Office of New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, The New York City
Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices: A Report to the People of the State of
New York from the Office of the Attorney General, Dec. 1, 1999, at pt. 1, available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop-frisk/stop-frisk.html. A draft report of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights found that racial profiling accounted
for much of the NYPD stop and frisk practices. See, e.g., Kevin Flynn, Rights Panel
Scolds Police on Race Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at B1 (citing data from 1998
that showed that while blacks make up nine percent of the Staten Island population,
fifty-one percent of those stopped and searched were black); see Jim Yardley, The
Diallo Shooting: The Community In Two Minority Neighborhoods, Residents See a
Pattern of Hostile Street Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3 ("The police con-
sider the stop-and-frisk an essential tool in reducing crime, arresting suspects and seiz-
ing illegal guns, but many residents in minority neighborhoods say it has become an
indiscriminate method of harassment."). More recently, an examination of data from
January through June 2003 revealed that almost eighty-three percent of those stopped
and frisked were black or Latino. Alice McQuillan, Say Blacks Targeted for Frisking,
DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2003, at 6 (recognizing the depth of the problem of race-based
searches and seizures, the United States Department of Justice issued Guidance Re-
garding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies); see also U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies, June 2003, available at http://pub.bna.com/cl/RacialProfiling.
pdf.
25. Civilian Complaint Review Bd., Street Stop Encounter Report: An Analysis of
CCRB Complaints Resulting From the New York Police Department's "Stop &
Frisk" Practices, June 2001, at 1, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/stop.
pdf.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Judy Mann, War on Drugs Can't Help but Run Amok, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 2000, at Cl. The name "Operation Condor" was also used to refer to a
coordinated effort in the 1970s by several South American military governments to
locate and murder exiled political dissidents. See, e.g., Lynne Duke, A Plot Thickens;
Three Decades After Chile's Right-Wing Coup, Historians Have Yet to Dot the i's. But
One Thinks He May Have Crossed a K, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005, at D1.
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ficer who asked him where he could buy marijuana.28 Somehow,
after Mr. Dorismond "reacted angrily," he was shot and killed. In
much the same way that the killing of Amadou Diallo prompted an
inquiry into the policy and behavior of the SCU, the killing of Pat-
rick Dorismond led to questions concerning Operation Condor.29
It soon became apparent that "75 percent of the arrests under
[Condor] have been for misdemeanors or even lesser offenses,
known as violations."3 The focus on relatively minor crimes and
violations, and the concomitant disproportionate impact on people
of color, in many ways characterize the NYPD's criminal justice
policy of the past decade.31 In fact, one of the architects of the
"Broken Windows" theory, James Q. Wilson, observed presciently,
and frighteningly, that the overwhelming desire to reduce crime
might mean that "[y]oung black and Hispanic men will probably be
stopped more often than older white Anglo males or women of any
race. "32
The motivations for, and consequences of, the creation and im-
plementation of these police strategies have been the subject of
much analysis and debate. Yet, what happens to those arrested
pursuant to these strategies has been glaringly bereft of critical re-
view. What happens with these cases inside the walls of the crimi-
nal courts is a question that remains unanswered.
28. Tina Kelley, Police Shooting Victim is Remembered and Mourned in Tears and
Song, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at B4.
29. Id. Apparently, Mr. Dorismond "was particularly upset about being mistaken
for a drug dealer, and said so." Sheryl McCarthy, You Can't Shoot People Just for
Talking Back to You, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Mar. 26, 2000, at 06.
30. Kevin Flynn, Shooting Raises Scrutiny of Police Antidrug Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2000, at Al.
31. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 9, at 299 ("[A] law enforcement strategy thatemphasizes misdemeanor arrests has a disproportionate effect on minorities .... ");
Joe Davidson, Is Zero Tolerance a Solution or a Problem?, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2004, at B1 ("The fatal NYPD shootings of Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond
... went hand-in-hand with a war on crime that seemed to legitimize police abuse and
racism."); William K. Rashbaum, Falling Crime in New York Defies Trend, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, at B1 (noting that almost one million people were arrested for
minor violations in the preceding eight years, and citing Professor Michael Jacobson
of John Jay College of Criminal Justice regarding the "fraying effect" such zero toler-
ance approaches have on relationships between police and minority citizens).
32. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 47.
For Wilson, that was a fair price to pay in order to try and remove illegal guns from
the street. Id. A recent study by the New York Criminal Justice Agency revealed yet
another by-product of ramped up quality-of-life policing-an increase in the arrests ofolder, chronic offenders with myriad social problems, and a similar upsurge with re-
spect to minority youths, with no adult convictions, arrested for low-level drug of-
fenses. CJA Research Brief, supra note 6.
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Over twenty years ago, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York issued a report bemoaning the lack of trials in the New
York City Criminal Court. 33 The report noted that only one-half of
one percent of all misdemeanor cases went to trial in the preceding
year.34 By all accounts, the situation is even more dire-there are
tens of thousands more misdemeanor cases, yet the trial rate is ac-
tually plummeting. In addition to the dearth of jury verdicts,
there are also very few determinations of the constitutionality of
the police officers' probable cause to stop, search, and arrest. The
court does not even appear to keep records of the number of sup-
pression hearings held, let alone the outcomes of those hearings.36
The result is virtually unfettered, unchecked police activity and dis-
cretion. Once an officer makes an arrest, it is for all intents and
purposes insulated from any meaningful challenge or review.37
33. Criminal Courts Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Saving the
Criminal Court: A Report on the Caseload Crisis and Absence of Trial Capacity in
the Criminal Court of the City of New York 1983, at 18-19 [hereinafter Caseload
Crisis].
34. Id. at 3. The report added bluntly: "If you tell people that several months
went by recently in Brooklyn Criminal Court without a single person being tried for
anything they will tell you, quite correctly, that you are talking about something which
is not a court." Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
35. State of N.Y., Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Bureau of Justice Research and
Innovation, Misdemeanor Arrests New York City (on file with author). In fact, the
New York City misdemeanor trial rate in 2003 was less than one third of one percent.
See id. The lack of trials appears to be a widespread phenomenon. See, e.g., Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Fed-
eral and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-84 (2004); Gina Holland,
As Plea Deals Mount, Jury Trials Diminish, SUNDAY REPUBLICAN, Aug. 8, 2004, at
A3.
36. Telephone interviews with Alan J. Murphy, Chief Clerk, Manhattan Supreme
Court, Criminal Branch (Apr. 2004), and Chester Mount, Director of Research and
Technology, New York State Unified Court System, Office of Court Administration
(Apr. 2004) [hereinafter Telephone Interviews].
37. In addition, the accused can not realistically turn to the appellate courts for
redress. As a study of the New York Court of Appeals concluded, "Criminal defend-
ants have little hope of being heard by the Court on the merits of their claim, and
those chosen few who do get heard lose their cases in overwhelming numbers." Nor-
man A. Olch, Soft on Crime? Not the New York Court of Appeals, N.Y. L.J., May 6,
1996, at 1; see John Caher, Court Grants Record Low Criminal Appeals; Convictions
Affirmed in 1999 Reach 76 Percent, N.Y. L.J., May 16, 2000, at 1 ("[T]he odds of a
criminal convict getting his or her case before the Court of Appeals are low and de-
clining, while the chances of getting before the Court and prevailing are reed-slim.");
Gary Spencer, Report Shows Court of Appeals Sheds Caseload, with 198 Decisions in
1998, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 1999, at 1 (discussing the Court's "continuing reluctance in
criminal cases to grant defendants leave to appeal"). The reversal rate in criminal
appeals is also plummeting in the intermediate appellate courts. See, e.g., John Caher
et al., Appellate Panels See Their Influence Rise; Tribunals Take on Role of Court of
Last Resort, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2001, at 1.
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The free reign given to the police is even more troubling when
considered in light of the well-documented history of police mis-
conduct and corruption in New York City. In 1992, then New York
City Mayor David N. Dinkins assembled the Mollen Commission
in response to numerous and spreading allegations of drug dealing
and corruption in several police precincts.38 The Commission's
charge was "to investigate the nature and extent of corruption in
the Department; to evaluate the Department's procedures for
preventing and detecting corruption; and to recommend changes
and improvements in those procedures. '39 The creation of a Com-
mission to investigate the NYPD has become something of a ritual
in New York City. One of the members of the Mollen Commission
wrote about the "apparent twenty-year cycles of police corruption
scandals. ' 40 The Commission itself observed that "If]or the past
century, police corruption scandals in New York City have run in a
regular twenty-year cycle of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh
scandal.""4 1 Indeed, the recent arrest and indictment of an NYPD
detective and his retired partner has all the hallmarks of the behav-
ior that precipitated the assembling of the Mollen Commission and
other similar commissions. 42
38. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Dinkins Names Police Corruption Panel and
Urges Civilian Police Review, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Al (reporting on
Dinkins's appointment of a five member anti-corruption panel, headed by former
Deputy Mayor for Public Safety, Milton Mollen).
39. Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Cor-
ruption Procedures of the Police Dep't, City of New York, Commission Report 1994,
at 11 [hereinafter Mollen Report], available at http://www.parc.info/reports/pdf/mol-
lenreport.pdf.
40. J. Harold Baer, Jr., Symposium Speeches: The Mollen Commission and Be-
yond, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 5, 5 (1995).
41. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 148 (documenting 100 years of NYPD cor-
ruption scandals); see also Clifford Krauss, Corruption in Uniform: The Long View;
Bad Apple Shake-Ups: A 20-Year Police Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B2. Even
a former NYPD Commissioner acknowledged the inevitability of police scandals.
Benjamin Ward, A Former Commissioner's View on Investigating Corruption, 40
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 45, 53-54 (1995) ("I believe we will probably have another cor-
ruption scandal in twenty years . ").
42. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, A Widening Inquiry Focuses on Officers Tied
to Drug Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at Al (referring to the investigation as
"the biggest police corruption case in a decade"). The prevalence of widespread and
entrenched police corruption is by no means limited to New York City. See, e.g.,
Charles Rappleye, Another Rupture in the LAPD's Thin Blue Line, NEWSDAY, Oct.
10, 1999, at B4. The corruption uncovered a few years ago in the Los Angeles Police
Department rivals what occurred in New York. Id. A police officer was arrested for
stealing cocaine from an evidence locker, and in exchange for leniency he revealed
rampant misconduct in the Department's Rampart Division. Id. One result was the
formation of the Los Angeles Police Commission. Id. Coincidentally, Los Angeles
had convened another police commission, the Christopher Commission, just a few
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As one considers the myriad reasons why police misconduct so
regularly reoccurs, it is necessary to consider the typical responses
to it. As the story of corruption begins to unfold, the airwaves be-
come replete with prosecutors vowing full and thorough investiga-
tions and promising to bring the full force of the law to bear.43 In
the scandal's wake comes the usual hand-wringing and calls for re-
vamping the Police Department and creating independent police
review boards." Inevitably, the ensuing wrangling between those
who favor and those who oppose such oversight deflects attention
from the underlying issue-how best to police police corruption.
Surely there are a multitude of reasons why the problem persists,
but it is time to look critically at the responses of the legal system's
institutional players-particularly, the courts and the prosecutors.
My focus is on a particular type of corruption-what the Mollen
Commission termed "falsifications. 45 The Mollen Commission di-
vided this type of corruption into three categories: "testimonial
perjury, as when an officer testifies falsely under oath ... ; docu-
mentary perjury, as when an officer swears falsely under oath in an
affidavit or criminal complaint; and falsification of police records,
as when an officer falsifies the facts and circumstances of an arrest
in police reports. '46 Not only do these "falsifications" directly im-
pact the courts, but, according to the Commission, they are "proba-
bly the most common form of police corruption facing the criminal
justice system. ' 47 In fact, the Commission found that the police
practice of falsification was so prevalent in some precincts that it
generated its own term-"testilying. ' 48 These findings are not rev-
years earlier in the aftermath of the brutal beating of Rodney King. See Joe
Domanick, Law Enforcement; Civilian Control of LAPD Is Elusive Despite Reforms,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at Mi.
43. See, e.g., Break the Police Corruption Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A26
("The city needs an outside force, whether an independent special prosecutor or the
investigatory commission recommended by Mr. Mollen to take over in the fight
against corruption.").
44. Id.; Paul Chevigny, The Too-Secret Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at A23.
45. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 36.
46. Id.
47. Id. A recent study found that perjury by police officers was among the leading
causes of wrongful convictions. See Liptak, supra note 20.
48. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 36. Some have similarly referred to the po-
lice practice of falsifying reports as "reportilying." See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1044
(1996).
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elations. The belief that police falsification is ubiquitous is widely
held.4 9
What, then, have been the responses to this sweeping indict-
ment? How has the judiciary responded to the revelation that
some percentage of police officers were testifying falsely in their
courts, swearing falsely to criminal complaints, and/or falsifying po-
lice reports?
Testimonial perjury-false testimony under oath-rears its head
particularly in suppression hearings.5 0  The Mollen Commission
found that corrupt officers "manufactured facts" to justify unlawful
searches and arrests.51 According to the Commission, "a common
tale was the person dropped a bag . . . as the officers ap-
proached.'52 This so-called "dropsy" testimony, designed to over-
come any constitutional objection to the police activity, is not new.
In People v. McMurty, 3 Criminal Court Judge Irving Younger dis-
cussed the sudden emergence of "dropsy" testimony, and observed
that it was only after the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio54 that he heard police officers
49. See, e.g., Carol A Chase, Policing the Criminal Justice System: Rampart: A
Crying Need to Restore Police Accountability, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001)
(commenting that "[ilt has long been apparent that police officers testify untruthfully
to avoid detection of their misconduct"); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43
EMORY L.J. 1311, 1312 (1994) (explaining that "[tlhe empirical studies on the subject
suggest that perjured testimony is common, particularly in drug prosecutions"); Alan
Dershowitz, Is Legal Ethics Asking the Right Questions, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETHics
15, 16 (1996) ("The Mollen Commission, the Knapp Commission, every commission
that has studied the problem of police perjury, has in my view seriously understated
the problem and yet has come to the conclusion that police perjury is rampant.");
Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHics, 42 (Summer/Fall 1982)
(arguing that police perjury is "systemic").
50. The Mollen Commission noted that police falsification was most prevalent in
cases involving possessory offenses, especially narcotics and guns. Mollen Report,
supra note 39, at 36; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of
Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59
U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 233, 248 (1998); Slobogin, supra note 48, at 1043 ("[T]he most com-
mon venue for testilying is the suppression hearing .... ); Andrew J. McClurg, Good
Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 389, 391 n.3 (1999) ("This Article makes a strong case that police
lying, particularly in search and seizure litigation, is pervasive.").
51. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 37.
52. Id.
53. 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. 1970).
54. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Lewis Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on
Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 471,482 (2001) ("The impact of Mapp was
naturally greatest in the African-American community where Fourth Amendment vi-
olations were the most common. Whatever limited effect Mapp would have, it would
be felt most where police conduct was the least restrained.").
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testify that defendants dropped drugs as the police approached.55
The logic behind "dropsy" testimony is simple-if the defendant
dropped the evidence then there is no search to complain of. One
study of pre- and post-Mapp cases raised similar issues of police
perjury, and concluded that "police are lying about the circum-
stances of such arrests so that the contraband . . . will be admissi-
ble."'5 6 Judge Younger urged over thirty years ago that "dropsy"
testimony "should be scrutinized with especial caution. 57
So then, what happens at hearings when police officers espouse
"dropsy" testimony or manufacture other facts to justify illegal
searches?58 Are lying police officers caught by judges presiding
over suppression hearings? Although there is no hard data,59 the
anecdotal evidence indicates that police officers "testily" with rela-
tive impunity.
Searches reveal precious few cases where evidence was sup-
pressed based on testimonial perjury.60 Given the Mollen Commis-
sion's finding that it is part of the most common form of corruption
facing the criminal justice system,61 and the recognition that police
perjury is indeed a widespread problem,62 this is worrisome, to say
the least. Ironically, rather than subjecting police testimony to
some form of heightened scrutiny, especially regarding dropsy
cases, it appears that courts imbue police testimony with height-
ened credence. As the Mollen Commission concluded, "In short,
the tolerance the criminal justice system exhibits takes the form of
a lesser level of scrutiny when it comes to police officers' testi-
55. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
56. Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Man-
hattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549-50 (1968).
57. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
58. The Mollen Commission also noted many other "manufactured tales." Mollen
Report, supra note 39, at 38 ("To conceal an unlawful search of an individual who
officers believe is carrying drugs or a gun, they will falsely assert that they saw a bulge
in the person's pocket or saw drugs and money changing hands."). Dropsy testimony
is by no means a relic of the past. See, e.g., DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE:
DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG D.A. 36-38 (1990) (recounting his experience with
dropsy testimony while working as an Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan).
59. See Telephone Interviews, supra note 36.
60. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 50, at 416 n.170 (referring to findings of the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society
that "motions to suppress evidence are rarely granted").
61. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 38.
62. See Skolnick, supra note 49, at 42 (explaining that police perjury is systemic).
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mony. Fewer questions are asked; weaker explanations are
accepted."63
The language used in the few opinions where evidence was sup-
pressed based on apparent police falsification is also telling. The
courts' choice of words seems to reflect deliberate efforts to avoid
calling police officers "liars." 64 Typically, the opinion states that
the officer's testimony was "tailored to nullify constitutional objec-
tion. ' 65 Even in those cases where the courts use harsher language,
they steer clear from calling the officer a liar or perjurer.66
One might imagine, given the rarity with which police officers
are deemed incredible, that those select few officers would be sub-
ject to dire consequences. The NYPD, however, has shown little
63. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 42. This finding is especially troubling in the
context of dropsy testimony. Not only did Judge Younger urge that such testimony be
viewed with a jaundiced eye, but less than one year later, in People v. Berrios, 270
N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1971), the District Attorney of Manhattan expressed his concern
regarding police perjury and "dropsy" cases. Remarkably, the District Attorney
joined the defense in urging the court to hold that in dropsy cases the prosecution
should shoulder the ultimate burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of the
warrantless search. The District Attorney's brief stated, "For the last ten years par-
ticipants in the system of justice-judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and police
officials-have privately and publicly expressed the belief that in some substantial but
indeterminable percentage of dropsy cases, the testimony ... is tailored to meet the
requirements of search-and-seizure rulings." Id. at 714 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting). The
court, however, declined to switch the burden of proof. Id. at 713.
64. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 49, at 1323-24 ("Judges simply do not like to call
other government officials liars-especially those who appear regularly in court.");
David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
455, 470-71 (1999) ("[A] scathing opinion impugning the motives, honesty, or compe-
tency of police is rarely found in trial court opinions.").
65. See, e.g., People v. Garofalo, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500 (App. Div. 1974); People v.
Aquiar, No. 51140(U), Slip Op. (N.Y. Co. Ct. Feb. 13, 2003); People v. Brown, N.Y.
L.J., July 22, 2002 (Bx. Sup. Ct.); People v. Curanovic, N.Y. L.J., May 2, 2003 (Bx.
Sup. Ct).
66. See, e.g., People v. Cassidy, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 1993 (Kings Sup. Ct.) ("The
frequency of these farcical stories about how the arrest is made, can only lead to the
conclusion that somewhere in the system, someone is telling young police officers
what to say, irrespective of what actually happened in the street."); People v. Marti-
nez, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 1992 (Kings Sup. Ct.) ("The Court finds the testimony of the
... Police witnesses to be factually unclear and unreliable."); People v. Acosta, N.Y.
L.J., June 25, 1991 (Bx. Sup. Ct.) (referring to "obvious flaws in the officer's testimony
and its inherent unbelievability," and stating that "obvious attempts by police to cir-
cumvent our basic fourth amendment freedoms ... will not be tolerated"); People v.
Akwa, 573 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1991) ("Based upon the glaring inconsistencies
revealed in his testimony, and upon the manifestly false explanations he manufac-
tured to account for them, I find his testimony unworthy of belief."); People v. Fair-
ley, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1990 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) ("Particularly disturbing to this Court is
the willingness of the enforcer of our laws to distort the truth to justify his ends.").
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interest in policing falsifications.67 While disappointing, to say the
least, it is not unexpected. Ever since there have been police de-
partments, much has been written about the unwillingness and in-
ability of the police to police itself.68 Trial judges, who observe the
witness swear to tell the truth and then willingly, brazenly, and
publicly violate that oath, occupy another position entirely. And,
no matter how gently and carefully it is labeled, a finding of police
incredibility is another way of saying that the officer committed a
crime-perjury.69 Contrast a case where evidence is suppressed
because of police perjury with one where evidence is suppressed
because the officer, while testifying truthfully, did not have the req-
uisite quantum of information to support his actions. While both
result in "illegal" or "unlawful" searches, the one predicated on
perjury is "illegal" in the truest sense of the word. Yet, judges by
and large do not refer these cases to the appropriate law enforce-
ment authorities.
Are judges aware of the problem of police testimonial perjury?
One judge in New York City candidly admitted as much: "Few
have not been troubled by police testimony obviously tailored or
patently false."' 70  One commentator observed that the "regular
participants in the criminal justice system"-judges included-all
know that police officers commit perjury.7' Perhaps, while judges
may acknowledge the existence of police perjury generally, it is an
altogether different proposition to discern and label it in a particu-
lar case. This may be especially true when dealing with a profes-
sional, experienced police officer witness.72
67. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 41 (noting that "supervisors were rarely, if
ever, held accountable for the falsifications of their subordinates" and that there was
not "a single, self-initiated Internal Affairs Division investigation into patterns of po-
lice perjury"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[w]ith rare exceptions law enforcement
agencies do not impose direct sanctions on the individual officer" when evidence is
suppressed).
68. See, e.g., Don't Veto the Police Commission, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1994, at A18;
Mark H. Moore & David M. Kennedy, N.Y.P.D. Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at
A19; Mr. Giuliani's Police Ploy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at 18; The Case for a Police
Monitor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at 18.
69. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210 (McKinney 2003).
70. People v. Diaz, 625 N.Y.S.2d 388, 397 (Bx. Sup. Ct. 1994).
71. Cloud, supra note 49, at 1311-12; McClurg, supra note 50, at 403 ("Judges
know about police lying.").
72. Cloud, supra note 49, at 1321-22 (noting that judges often accept perjury be-
cause it is difficult to determine if a police officer is lying, particularly if he is an
experienced witness).
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Yet, we are told that perjury exists, and so it must be discovered.
Instead of accepting police testimony as truthful, judges should be
skeptical and scrutinize the testimony in the way suggested by
Judge Younger thirty-five years ago.73 They should listen carefully
for catch phrases designed to justify warrantless searches.74 One
judge has suggested that to overcome police fabrications judges
must also take a more active role in determining the facts.75 In that
case, the judge ordered a crime scene visit to verify independently
the testimony's credibility and accuracy.76 Perhaps above all,
judges must be willing to find and state that a police officer has
committed perjury.
What, then, about those exceptional cases where judges do find
the police witness to be incredible? Given how rare it is for a judge
to make such a finding, one imagines that the offending officer's
testimony must have been beyond the pale. Surely in those cases
the judges refer the perjurer to the appropriate NYPD and
prosecutorial authorities. Apparently, even in cases finding testi-
monial falsification, judges are loath to report the "testilier" to the
appropriate authorities.77
No doubt, part of the judicial reluctance is grounded in concerns
of certainty-how sure should a judge be before referring a police
officer for investigation? The standards that govern prosecutors
are illuminating. Prosecutors are advised to file charges if there is
probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime. 78
73. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for
the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 787, 790 (2001) ("[Jjudges unwittingly
participate in police perjury and misconduct by not critically examining police credi-
bility .... ).
74. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 37-38. The Mollen Report refers to police
fabricating probable cause by relying on legal language such as "hot pursuit" or "plain
view." Id.
75. Diaz, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
76. Id. at 393.
77. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 73, at 794.
[T]here has been a failure by judges who have witnessed police perjury to
take meaningful action to prevent such misconduct in the future. A judge's
standard course of action when an officer has lied is to dismiss the case or
grant a motion to suppress, and ask the prosecutors to report the misconduct
to appropriate police internal affairs authorities. There is no follow-up by
the court, no judicial reporting of the misconduct, no contempt orders, and
no tracking of the problem officers.
Id. A judge in California recently spelled out her inner conflict as she declined to go
after officers she suspected of having testified falsely in her courtroom. Katherine
Mader, Conundrum: How Should a Judge Act if She Suspects Two Police Officers
Have Testified Falsely, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 10.
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(a) (2002).
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One scholar suggests that prosecutors actually need only a "fair
possibility" of guilt in order to commence a prosecution.79 It
stretches credulity to imagine that a judge finding that an officer
had tailored his testimony to overcome constitutional requirements
would not concomitantly have probable cause, or a fair possibility,
to believe the officer committed perjury. Judges must strive to un-
cover perjury, and, when they do root it out, they must not let their
findings go unnoticed.
For all the varieties of police falsification, perhaps the most re-
vealing was the practice of "trading collars. '80 Not content to ex-
aggerate or lie about what they did or did not do during the arrest,
in this recurring scenario police officers testified about events that
occurred when they were not even present:
In one precinct we investigated, a cooperating officer told us of
a regular pattern of "trading collars." The purpose of this prac-
tice was to accumulate overtime pay for the officers involved. In
the scheme, the police officer who actually arrested the defen-
dant would pass off the arrest to a colleague who was not in-
volved or even present at the time of the arrest. Trading collars
was done to maximize the overtime pay because the regular day
off of the officer taking the arrest coincided with the likeliest
date for a required court appearance. The officer who took the
arrest would get all the details from the actual arresting officer,
fill out the arrest papers, interview with the District Attorney,
and, if necessary, testify to the circumstances of the arrest.8
The critical question is what has the judiciary done post-Mollen
Commission to make sure it is able to ferret out perjury, and that it
79. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588
(2003). Green argues that Model Rule 3.8(a), dealing with the decision whether to
prosecute, is a standard "that is both too low and incomplete." Id. In another article,
Green observed that "most commentators would agree that a prosecutor should not
bring charges unless she has some degree of confidence that the person charged is in
fact guilty-although there is disagreement about how much confidence is needed."
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837,
843 n.25 (2004). Several commentators have argued that prosecutors should be per-
sonally convinced of the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prose-
cutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 339-42 (2001); John Kaplan, The
Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 178 (1965-66).
80. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 39.
81. Id. at 39-40; see also Joe Sexton, Types of Perjury Common Among Police Of-
ficers Are Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at 27.
They are called "turnover arrests." A police officer arrests a suspect but has
plans for the weekend and doesn't want to spend the next day in court. So
he asks his partner not only to take credit for the arrest, but to take the
witness stand in front of the grand jury as well. As mundane as the motiva-
tion is, the resulting testimony nevertheless amounts to perjury.
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never again becomes a complicit or unwitting participant in police
falsifications. How have judges responded to the embarrassing andterrifying revelation that they were being duped in many cases?What has the Criminal Court done in response to the clarion callfor judicial oversight of the Police Department? Can it be that allthe judiciary is doing is relying on the NYPD to better police itself?How many more scandals must there be before the court changes
the way it does business? The problem persists because police of-ficers have learned since time immemorial that they can get awaywith it. It is time for the judiciary to look itself in the mirror andacknowledge its role, however unintentional, in the police falsifica-tions unearthed by the Mollen Commission.82 "Testiliers" correctlylearned that their lies would be credited, or, even if not, that they
would not suffer any ill consequences.83
There are other ways the judiciary can more effectively combatpolice falsifications. It is well past time for the judiciary to recon-
sider the use of the guilty plea, especially the guilty plea early inthe proceedings, as the engine that drives the Criminal Court. Fortoo long, police corruption has been buried under an avalanche of
guilty pleas:
A large part of the problem is that once officers falsify the basisfor an arrest, search, or other action in a Department record-such as an arrest report, complaint report, search warrant appli-cation, or evidence voucher-to avoid Departmental or criminalcharges, they must stick to their story even under oath whenswearing to a criminal complaint or giving testimony before atrial jury. But officers know that the operation of the criminaljustice system itself usually protects them from having to com-
82. See Dershowitz, supra note 49, at 23.The time has come for the courts to understand that they are a serious partof the problem.... Judges at every level of every court. Judges who are theones who say they believe [the perjury]. The appellate judges who say webelieve the judges who said they believe it.Id.; Dorfman, supra note 64, at 465 ("One of the strongest reasons that police lie incourt is the simple fact that judges allow them to get away with it."); Levenson, supranote 73, at 788 ("[J]udges must accept some responsibility for the Rampart scandal
83. Chase, supra note 49, at 769 ("In all but the most egregious of cases . . .apolice officer faces no direct consequences of his or her violation."); see Mollen Re-port, supra note 39, at 36 ("The challenge we face in combating police falsifications, isnot only to prevent the underlying wrongdoing that spawns police falsifications but toeliminate the tolerance the Department and the criminal justice system exhibit aboutpolice who fail to tell the truth."); Levenson, supra note 73, at 791 ("One can onlyassume that the officers who lied in the Rampart scandal felt emboldened to do sobecause they knew they could get away with it."); Slobogin, supra note 48, at 1045(arguing that police perjury persists because "police think they can get away with it").
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mit testimonial perjury before a grand jury or at trial. The vast
majority of charges for narcotics or weapons possession crimes
result in pleas without the necessity of grand jury or trial testi-
mony, thus obviating officers' concerns about the risk of detec-
tion and possible exposure to criminal charges of perjury.8 4
The high volume of pleas at arraignments85 is especially alarming
given that the defense lawyer has just met the client and has not yet
investigated and researched the facts and law of the case.86 The
threat of pretrial detention causes many defendants to strike a
Faustian bargain-rather than contest the charges, they plead
guilty in exchange for their freedom. In the words of one authority
on the Criminal Court, "Judges may, especially in misdemeanor
cases, set bail at a level they expect is too great for the defendant to
make, and then indicate to the defendant that were he to plead
guilty the sentence would be time served and he'd be released from
custody."87
84. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 36-37.
Trials put official behavior on public display; professionalism is reinforced
and sloppy, dishonest or abusive conduct is exposed for correction. When it
is extremely unlikely that a hearing or trial will ever examine the propriety
of their conduct or the truthfulness of what they say, police officers inevita-
bly become less concerned with how they make their arrests, conduct
searches and treat defendants.
Caseload Crisis, supra note 33, at 15; see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998) ("fully-adjudi-
cated cases may be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authori-
ties," and there are "too few misdemeanor trials to serve as an effective appeals
process to regulate prosecutorial decisions"). The lack of trials is endemic to criminal
justice systems. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (noting that in 2000, about ninety-five
percent of felony convictions in state courts were the result of guilty pleas).
85. In July-December 2003, nearly half of all cases arraigned in New York City
Criminal Court were disposed of at arraignment. Guilty pleas accounted for almost
two-thirds of those dispositions. N.Y. City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Annual Re-
port 2003, at 16.
86. Pleas at arraignments fly directly in the face of the lawyer's constitutional and
ethical duty to investigate. The American Bar Association Standards that govern de-
fense attorneys provide that defense counsel should "conduct a prompt investigation
of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to
the merits of the case," and "[u]nder no circumstances should defense counsel recom-
mend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless a full investigation . . . has been
completed." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-4.1, 4-6.1 (1980).
87. Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining
Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1382 (2004); see also Bibas, supra note 84, at 2491-
93; Heilbroner, supra note 58, at 58. Recently, a city court judge was removed from
the bench for, inter alia, using bail to coerce pleas. See, e.g., Andy Newman, Finding
Bail 'Shockingly High,' Court Tosses Out a Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at B5. In
2002, a New York City Criminal Court judge was censured for "mistreating defend-
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To best perform their justice-seeking mission, judges should en-
courage meaningful examinations of the facts and circumstances of
the arrest. Presently, it is commonplace for judges to revoke plea
offers if the defendant insists on a pretrial suppression hearing. It
is also typically the case that a conviction after trial results in a
sentence substantially higher than that attached to a guilty plea of-
fer. 8 The predictable result is a slew of guilty pleas that serve to
insulate police practice from scrutiny.
It may well be the case that transformation of the judicial reli-
ance on guilty pleas, especially at the accused's initial court appear-
ance, is also mandated by judicial ethics codes. According to the
American Bar Association Standards, judges are charged with"safeguarding the rights of the accused. '89 Surely, the accused's
right to a jury trial and to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures falls within the ambit of that admonition. 90 Judges must
actively "safeguard" the defendant's rights. 91 The notion of judges
as active participants is not far-fetched. In other contexts, com-
mentators have called on the judiciary to play a more active role to
ensure that all litigants have access to justice.92 The advent of
problem-solving courts has spawned a new way of thinking about a
ants and attorneys and for using bail to coerce guilty pleas." Tom Perrotta, 26 Judges
Publicly Disciplined by Commission Last Year, N.Y. L.J., Jul. 25, 2002, at 1.
88. See, e.g., MALCOLM C. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT-HAN-
DLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 197 (1979); Levenson, supra note 73, at
792.
[W]ittingly or not, judges provide the additional hammer prosecutors andpolice officers need to coerce defendants to forego trial and their right tochallenge the evidence. When judges routinely impose maximum sentenceson those who go to trial, and much more lenient sentences on those who donot, the message to defendants is that there is a devastating cost to exercise
their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Id.; Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Cen-
tered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 886 n.285 (1998). The New York State Com-mission on Judicial Conduct recently began investigating a complaint that judicialpractices such as "one-time-only" offers, and threatening increased incarceration ifthe defendant is convicted after trial, are coercive. See Daniel Wise, Probe Examines
Judges' Actions in Plea Process, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 1, 2005, at 1.
89. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6-1.1 (3d ed. 2000).
90. Klein, supra note 87, at 1372.91. See Abbe Smith, Defense-Oriented Judges, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1483, 1485(2004) (urging "more judges who care about protecting the rights of the accused, whowill put the government to the test").
92. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice:Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of
Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 969 (2004) (urging replacing "the paradigm ofjudge as passive umpire with the paradigm of judge as active umpire").
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judge's role in court proceedings. Problem-solving judges are
asked to take on a more participatory, active role in the resolution
of the cases in their courts. 93
In a related context, it is not uncommon these days for.judges to
publicly make themselves heard regarding their critical views about
existing laws. 94 Some have even suggested that organizations of
judges should lobby against unfair laws, or, at a minimum, take a
public stance.95
In a similar vein, judges should recognize and acknowledge the
importance of suppression hearings when considering a defense
motion to suppress evidence. If those hearings are the place where
police falsification is most likely to rear its head, 96 then it behooves
the court to hold more, not fewer, suppression hearings. One
would think that the publicized recognition about the dispropor-
tionate impact of present policing policies on people of color, and
the increasing acknowledgement that many are wrongly convicted,
would compel the courts to examine the basis for the search and
seizure in every case. Yet, in actuality the trend seems to be to-
ward narrow and overly strict interpretations of case law as a
means to deny defendants suppression hearings.97
Once a hearing is commenced, it must be viewed as an opportu-
nity to discover the truth. Judges should refrain from sacrificing
93. See, e.g., James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving
and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2003); Judith S. Kaye,
Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Ocr. 11, 1999, at 13 ("In these
new courts, judges are active participants in a problem-solving process."). For more
regarding problem-solving courts see infra notes 111-45 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Deborah Pines, Ten Years Later, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Go
Down Easier; Seen as Allowing Judges More Flexibility than Anticipated, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 3, 1997, at 1 ("Some of the loudest critics in the early years of the federal sen-
tencing guidelines were federal district judges."). In fact, some judges have resigned
from the bench in a public display of their distaste for the federal sentencing guide-
lines. See Leonard Post, Irked By Sentencing Law Two U.S. Judges Lash Out at "Fee-
ney," RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2004, at 3.
95. See, e.g., John Caher, Backer of Changes in Rockefeller Drug Law Says Judges
Should Get Off the Sidelines, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 7, 2004, at 1.
96. See generally Chin & Wells, supra note 50, 248-50 (noting the prevalence and
tolerance of police perjury in suppression hearings).
97. See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 624 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1993). The court in Men-
doza addressed the requirements of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60 regarding what
the defense must allege in a suppression motion in order to merit a hearing. The
Court stated that the factual allegations should be evaluated by the face of the plead-
ings, and assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion and the defendant's
access to information. Mendoza, 624 N.E.2d at 1021. Commentators have observed
that trial courts are increasingly applying Mendoza to deny defense motions for sup-
pression hearings. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Defendants in Possession Cases Face a
Dilemma in Pleading Standing, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1999, at 1.
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the truth-seeking function of the hearing at the altar of judicial ex-pediency and economy. If cross-examination 98 is indeed the bestmethod to ascertain the truth,99 then courts should not unduly limitthe scope and nature of the cross. 1' ° Similarly, the court shoulddemand that the prosecutor call as witnesses the police officersmost directly involved in the arrest. Increasingly, prosecutors areusing hearsay upon hearsay to make their case.1"1 This providesanother layer of insulation for a corrupt police officer. Finally, thecourt should be more willing to allow the defense to call its ownwitnesses, including any of the police officers involved with the ar-rest.10 2 Undoubtedly, some of these changes might result in greaterdemands on police time. The key question is whether the courtshould be most concerned with causing the police officer some de-gree of inconvenience, or with critically examining what occurred.The Mollen Report and the New York City history of police scan-
dals should answer that question easily.By turning their focus to the underlying actions of the police, thecourts will return to the lofty ideals of the exclusionary rule and thecritical role of the judiciary. In Weeks v. United States, the Courtestablished the rule excluding in a federal prosecution evidence ob-tained by federal agents in violation of the defendant's FourthAmendment rights.1 3 Subsequently, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Courtextended the exclusionary rule to the states as a matter of constitu-
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoythe right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").99. See, e.g., FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROss-EXAMINATION (4th ed.1948); J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A De-fense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 765 (1988)("[C]ross-examination is said to be an excellent vehicle for discovering and exposingthe falsehoods of mendacious witnesses.").100. For a discussion of the defendant's right to fully cross-examine the prosecu-tion's witnesses at a suppression hearing, see generally People v. Edwards, 741 N.E.2d876 (N.Y. 2000), and People v. Williamson, 588 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1991).101. The prosecution has the burden of going forward with evidence that shows aconstitutional basis for the arrest. See People v. Parris, 632 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y.1994). A police officer testifying at a suppression hearing can establish probablecause by personal knowledge or by information provided by others. See People v.Washington, 663 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (N.Y. 1996); Parris, 632 N.E.2d at 873. It is notalways the case, however, that hearsay will suffice. See, e.g., People v. Ketcham, 712N.E.2d 1238, 1241-43 (N.Y. 1999); People v. Gonzalez, 600 N.E.2d 238, 238-39 (N.Y.
1992).
102. See People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that the right ofcompulsory process at a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of identificationtestimony is within the court's discretion); see also People v. Skinner, 632 N.Y.S.2d283, 285 (App. Div. 1995); People v. Acquaah, 562 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (App. Div. 1990)("A defendant's right to call a witness at a suppression hearing is not absolute.").
103. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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tional law so that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitu-
tion was inadmissible in a criminal trial in state court.10 4 Over
time, the Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule's "pri-
mary purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct and thereby ef-
fectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 10 5 Put another way, "Its pur-
pose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it.' 1 0 6 The logic is straightforward-evidence must be
suppressed in order to deter the police from violating the
Constitution.1 "7
If, on the other hand, evidence is virtually never suppressed, ille-
gal searches will thrive.'0 8 No doubt the findings of the Mollen
Commission and the New York State Attorney General support
that conclusion. Perhaps former Chief Justice Warren Burger put
it best, "The rule has rested on a theory that suppression of evi-
dence in these cases was imperative to deter law enforcement au-
104. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
105. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 235 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining that one justi-
fication for the exclusionary rule is its role in "exert[ing] general legal pressures to
secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of federal law-enforcing of-
ficers"); Daniel S. Schneider, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Develop-
ment of State Constitutional Law, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 377, 384 (1987) (arguing that the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct).
106. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
107. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department "Pattern or Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 3, 17-18 (2003) (noting that court oversight of police conduct is limited by the
number and kind of issues considered by courts); see also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the
courts, and then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating
evidence and the defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be in-
dicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automo-
bile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of
the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am
convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles
of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is
made, about which the courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and
through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who fre-
quently are guilty.
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson, J., disssenting).
108. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 54, at 481 (the message that the government must
obey the law while enforcing it is "lost when trial judges deny motions to suppress pro
forma").
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thorities from using improper methods to obtain evidence. '10 9
Burger went on to observe that law enforcement would be de-
terred if the evidence is "suppressed often enough.""0 Suffice it to
say that the Criminal Court has long since abandoned this critical
role, and we all pay the price with the outbreak of every police
scandal and/or publication of reports detailing stop and frisk
abuses on our streets.
What do the courts as a whole now do differently? How have
the courts changed in the quality-of-life, zero tolerance policing,
post-Mollen Commission world? In the past decade, so-called
problem-solving courts have begun to dot the judicial landscape.1a '
Drug treatment courts, domestic violence courts, community courts
and even commercial courts, have evolved from interesting pilot
projects to mainstream court administration.11 2 Under the leader-
ship of Chief Judge Judith Kaye, New York has assumed the posi-
tion as the state judiciary most committed to reinventing the way
its courts do business. 1 3 Problem-solving courts "use the coercive
authority of the courts to achieve more meaningful case out-
comes," 114 and "broaden the focus of legal proceedings from fact-finding and narrow legal issues to changing the future behavior of
litigants (and the future well-being of communities).""' 5 Leading
proponents of problem-solving courts revel in the prospects of
"full-scale reform of [the] state court system."'1 6 The State's Chief
109. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
111. For a further discussion of problem-solving courts see generally Greg Berman& John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Primer, 23 LAw & POL'Y 125 (2001);
Judith Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1491 (1999); andBruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2003).
112. Even the Supreme Court is weighing in. In his speech at the American BarAssociation's annual meeting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer urged the development of
problem-solving courts. See Molly McDonough, ABA Notes: Breyer on Supreme Ci-
vility, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at A15.
113. Judge Kaye's efforts in this regard have received national attention and recog-nition. She was awarded the National Center for State Courts' 1999 William H.Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence based on her "innovative, problem-solving
approach to justice." See Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 10, 1999, at 1. There
are almost thirty problem-solving courts operating presently in New York City alone.
See Rayner, supra note 1, at 1049 n.63. There are already more than 1000 problem-
solving courts nationwide. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Beyond Process and Pre-
cedent. The Rise of Problem Solving Courts, 41 JUDGES' J. 1, 6 (2002).114. John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court
Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 282 (2000).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 279-80.
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Administrative Judge speaks of "institutionalizing [the] problem-
solving approach into the very fabric of what we do in the courts on
a daily basis." 117
Court innovation is to be commended. Unquestionably, the age-
old way of doing business in the Criminal Court was not working
on any measure," 8 and it is no small accomplishment to reform the
culture of the courts.1 9 Still, the problem-solving court movement
must be carefully scrutinized. Although imbued with noble goals,
it is imperative to ask whether these courts actually encourage or
discourage a probing, critical examination of how the police came
to bring the accused under the thumb of the criminal justice system
in the first place.
The advent of problem-solving courts coincides with the massive
influx of misdemeanor arrests. In fact, the increase in caseloads is
typically cited as perhaps the primary impetus for the development
of these courts. 2 ° A careful look backward is informative. On
July 6, 1994, New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton
and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani formally unveiled their quality-of-life
initiative.' 2 ' The very next day, the Mollen Commission issued its
long-awaited report detailing widespread police corruption.122 The
quality-of-life program focused on low-level misbehavior, and de-
centralized police practice so that precinct officers could intervene
in all types of cases, rather than deferring to specialized units. 23
Ironically, especially coming the day before the release of the Mol-
len Report, the specialized unit approach had been put into place
about twenty years earlier following the Knapp Commission's re-
117. John Caher, $1.14 Billion Budget Proposed By Judiciary; 3.4% Increase Sought
in Court Spending, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1999, at 5 (quoting New York's Chief Adminis-
trative Judge Jonathan Lippman).
118. See, e.g., Greg Berman, What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?, 84 JUDICATURE
78, 83 (Sept./Oct. 2000) ("[T]he system from which the problem-solving courts have
emerged was a failure on any count.") (statement of panelist Ellen Schall).
119. See, e.g., MALCOLM C. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SO-
LUTIONS FAIL (1983) (evaluating various means of court reform).
120. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 118, at 80 (responding to the question, "What are
the conditions that have created problem-solving courts?" New York State's Chief
Judge, Judith Kaye, said, "Unquestionably, the first modern day reality that you have
to look at is the number of cases in the state courts, which are huge." Judge Kaye
added that "We have many, many more quality-of-life crimes."); Berman & Feinblatt,
supra note 111, at 128 (citing "rising caseloads" as among the most important forces
contributing to the development of problem-solving courts, and specifically mention-
ing the "explosion" in quality-of-life cases in New York City).
121. See supra note 10.
122. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 10.
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port on police corruption.'2 4 What was the court to do once con-
fronted simultaneously with the findings of the Mollen
Commission and with the aftermath of quality-of-life, zero toler-
ance policing? The burgeoning court dockets presaged problem-
solving courts and changes in the way the courts do business, but
there has been no corresponding judicial response to the Mollen
Report.
So, just as volumes of misdemeanor cases came to dominate
court calendars, problem-solving approaches began to permeate ju-
dicial attitudes. As the net widened, and the police arrested more
people-primarily people of color-for relatively minor transgres-
sions, the courts began to change their focus. In fact, zero toler-
ance policing and problem-solving courts operate on a similar
principle-once you have someone under your control, you have
the opportunity to uncover and tend to larger problems. We can-
not, and must not, uncouple the proliferation of problem-solving
courts from the underlying police activity that brought the accused
into court.
Problem-solving courts seek to promote a mindset of coopera-
tion among all the institutional players. Defense lawyers are urged
to shift from a litigation-based, adversarial approach to a team-
based problem-solving ideal.12 5 Typical of the descriptions of these
courts are comments about the Red Hook Community Justice
Center in Brooklyn, New York: "The prosecutor and defense law-
yer are part of the same team, working on the long-term best inter-
ests of individual defendants and the community. 126 While
124. The Knapp Commission was established in 1970 by an Executive Order of
Mayor John V. Lindsay. Ward, supra note 41, at 45 n.2. The Commission submitted
its report in December 1972. Id.; Sean Gardiner, Badges of Dishonor, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 14, 2005, at A7. Among the Commission's findings was "a police department
that was completely permeated by an attitude of permissiveness and tolerance for
low-level corruption." Michael Armstrong, Police Corruption: An Historical Over-
view, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1995). The NYPD's shift back to pre-Knapp
Commission policies raised the spectre of the reemergence of the types of corruption
that Knapp uncovered. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 10 ("The police had become spe-
cialists, partly out of fear of corruption."); Kelling, supra note 11 ("As the NYPD
devolves authority to precinct commanders and below, how will it prevent corrup-
tion?"); George James, Police Project on Street Vice Goes Citywide, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1994 ("[T]he new policy departs from the practices instituted following the Knapp
Commission era 20 years ago, when the department, seeking to fight corruption in
local precincts, emphasized the use of specialized units to address local conditions.").
125. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5
(1998); Nolan, supra note 93, at 1543; see generally Drug Courts Program Office, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components, Jan. 1997, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/html/bja/define/welcome.html.
126. Terry Carter, Red Hook Experiment, 90 A.B.A. J. 36, 39 (2004).
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defense attorneys are encouraged to fundamentally change the
ways they defend their clients, there have been no corresponding
changes to the constitutional standard of effective assistance of
counsel 27 or to the rules of professional ethics. 128
Proponents of problem-solving courts and its teamwork empha-
sis aver that the adversarial system is not working. It is more accu-
rate, however, to note that the Criminal Court is not, and has never
been, adversarial. Ever since Gideon v. Wainwright129 spawned the
development of public defender offices across the country, com-
mentators have detailed the widespread deficiencies of many indi-
gent defense providers. 130 Whether due to staggering caseloads,
institutional pressures, organizational cooptation, or bureaucratic
allegiances to other players in the court system, the proclivities of
indigent defense attorneys to plead out their clients are well-docu-
mented.13 1 Several leading proponents of problem-solving courts
put in simply-"All too many courtrooms have become 'plea bar-
gain mills. 1 32 Although the Criminal Court has been fraught with
problems, an overabundance of adversarialness is not one of them.
As one scholar observed, "the American system as it actually oper-
ates in most cases looks much more like what common lawyers
would describe as a non-adversarial, administrative system of jus-
127. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to counsel
incorporates the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (defendants are "entitled to the effective assis-
tance of counsel").
128. See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 111, at 137 ("Is there a need for new
standards of effective lawyering at problem-solving courts?"); John Feinblatt & Derek
Denckla, What Does it Mean to Be a Good Lawyer? Prosecutors, Defenders and Prob-
lem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206, 212 (2001) (according to one public de-
fender, "I worry about the effects of collaboration on zealous advocacy"); Mae C.
Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 50 (2000-2001).
129. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
130. See, e.g., ROBERT HERMANN ET AL., COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE IN URBAN AMERICA (1977); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Crimi-
nal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581
(1986-1987).
131. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,
84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182 (1975); Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confi-
dence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & Soc'y REV., June
1967, at 18; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise
of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 625, 656-75 (1986); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the
Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255, 256, 258-59 (1965).
132. John Feinblatt et al., The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MANAGER
28, 31 (2000).
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tice than like the adversarial model they idealize. '133 In this day
and age, what we actually need to develop is a true, full-scale ad-
versarial system where hearings and trials are the norm.
Other commentators believe that by abandoning even the sem-
blance of the adversarial system, and in so doing pushing aside con-
cerns of probable cause and culpability, problem-solving courts
inappropriately fast forward to sentencing.13 1 Particularly troub-
ling are those courts that encourage defendants, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, to plead guilty early in the proceedings. 135 Additional due
process concerns are raised in those courts that impose pre-adjudi-
cation conditions on the accused. 136 The result is a system exactly
the opposite of one that encourages a probing examination of the
underlying arrest and the accused's culpability. 37 Instead, prob-
lem-solving courts focus on treatment, usually part of sentencing
discussions. At best, you end up with a system of social service
133. Lynch, supra note 84, at 2118.
134. See, e.g., Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, "From Day One": Who's in Control as
Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 11, 28 (2004) ("These specialized courts are essentially extended
sentencing courts designed to support ongoing relationships and monitoring of the
offender by a judge and professional service providers who work for the court."); Jane
M. Spinak, Why Defenders Feel Defensive: The Defender's Role in Problem-Solving
Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1617, 1623 (2003) ("[T]here needs to be a more thor-
ough analysis of when the clients' due process rights are appropriately incorporated
into the problem-solving court rather than assuming these rights get in the way of
achieving good outcomes for clients.").
135. See Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 134, at 30; Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug
Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1437, 1533 (2000) ("In their mad rush to dispose of
cases, drug courts are risking the due process rights of defendants and turning all of
us-judges, staff, prosecutors, and public defenders alike-into cogs in an out-of-con-
trol case-processing machine."); Spinak, supra note 134, at 1620 (regarding the "cur-
rent trend in drug court procedure of requiring a guilty plea or waiver of other due
process rights as a condition of entering treatment, rather than permitting the defen-
dant to begin treatment without entering a plea"). But see Feinblatt et al., supra note
132, at 33 (suggesting that some problem-solving courts have procedures that "im-
prove upon the current climate of coercion").
136. See, e.g., Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 111, at 137 (regarding "pre-trial
rather than post-disposition interventions"); Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 128, at
210 ("A lot happens pre-conviction in problem-solving courts.") (statement by panel-
ist James R. Neuhard).
137. See, e.g., Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 128, at 210 ("In problem-solving
courts, the criminal justice system is consciously shifting resources out of the process
of adjudicating legal guilt and innocence and into treatment services because we don't
want to spend so much time playing adversarial games if defendants are going to end
up pleading guilty anyway.") (statement by panelist Scott Newman); id.
("[G]overnment accountability may be swept aside in order for defendants to access
treatment."); Kaye, supra note 125, at 4 ("You do not see a lot of litigating in this
court-in fact almost all of the defendants plead guilty. The focus in the Treatment
Court is not on adjudicating past facts, it is on changing future behavior.")
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programs grafted onto people, many of whom did not need to be in
the Criminal Court in the first place. 138
Whose problems do these courts purport to solve? The courts'?
The prosecution's? Law enforcement's? Society's? The defend-
ants'? And, what is the problem they purport to solve? Recidi-
vism? Public safety? Public perceptions about the courts and
justice? Public perceptions about, and fear of, crime? Court effi-
ciency in the face of huge caseloads? Alcohol and drug abuse?
These are obvious and vital questions for any discussion about
problem-solving courts.139 If the courts are concerned with the de-
fendant and his "problems," then we must ask what sort of thera-
peutic value is added by the problem-solving court. Well before
terms like problem-solving courts and "therapeutic jurispru-
dence"'140 came into the vernacular, scholars found that defendants
cared about more than the outcomes of their cases. To the surprise
of some, it turned out that defendants also cared deeply about the
process and whether they were treated fairly. 41 In fact, many sug-
gested that treating defendants fairly increased the chances that
they would avoid future misconduct.' 42
138. See Berman, supra note 118, at 82 (quoting one judge's view that "When you
try and channel the energies of social change into the judicial branch, it's not a good
fit"); Nolan, supra note 93, at 1541 (supporters of problem-solving courts "argue that
the need for legal change is heightened by the failure of traditional institutions to
handle a growing number of social problems").
139. One commentator suggests that problem-solving courts seek to address "the
underlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems of the justice sys-
tem, and the social problems of communities." Berman, supra note 118, at 78.
140. Therapeutic jurisprudence evaluates "the extent to which substantive rules, le-
gal procedures, and the roles of lawyers and judges produce therapeutic or antither-
apeutic consequences." David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Re-
search, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 981 (1991). "In less than a decade, therapeutic
jurisprudence, which began as a scholarly approach to mental health law, has emerged
as a mental health approach to law generally." Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 184 (1997). Many have
seen a natural connection between therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving
courts. See, e.g., Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 439 (1999).
141. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A Psy-
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67, 94-96 (1975); Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in
Court: Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 237 (1978); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evalua-
tions of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'y REv. 51 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact
of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 899 n.178
(1996); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
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The defendants' feelings of unfairness did not have to do with
whether they were treated therapeutically or whether their
problems were solved. Rather, defendants clamored for what boils
down to basic due process. They wanted an advocate to fight for
their rights, and for a judge to give them their day in court. De-
fendants voiced particular concerns about their lawyers. So-called
consumer perspective studies consistently reflect complaints that
lawyers failed to provide advice or counsel. 4 3 Instead, countless
defendants stated that their lawyers simply urged them, vocifer-
ously, to plead guilty.'" Defendants wanted, not surprisingly, an
advocate; a lawyer who would fight to enforce their rights. If we
truly cared about therapeutic value to the accused of court pro-
ceedings, we would strive mightily to ensure that every defendant
felt like he had his day in court and that all his rights were pro-
tected. Those do not seem to be high priority goals of the problem-
solving courts.' 45
One of the early criticisms of problem-solving courts was that
they were coercive. If the defendant wanted treatment, he had to
plead guilty. Litigating a case seemed to foreclose the possibility of
ever receiving a meaningful sentence. Some challenged the allega-
tion of coerciveness by arguing that the claim must be examined in
context. 146 If problem-solving courts are indeed coercive, then,
they argued, plea rates in those courts would be greater than in the
standard Criminal Court. One study found comparable plea rates
in the Midtown Community Court and the traditional Criminal
CRIME & JUST. 283, 297 (2003) (stating that "procedural justice is a key antecedent of
long-term compliance").
143. See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 88, at 873 n.200.
144. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE-THE DEFEN-
DANT'S PERSPECTIVE 106 (1972) ("Most of the men reported that among the first
words uttered by their public defender were: 'I can get you [-] if you plead guilty."');
Alan F. Arcuri, Lawyers, Judges, and Plea Bargaining: Some New Data on Inmates'
Views, 4 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 177, 183 (1976) (defendants "reported
that they were pressured into pleading guilty"); Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders as
Their Clients See Them, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 141, 143 (1972) ("[R]eal or imagined pres-
sure to plead guilty is a frequent complaint of defender clients.").
145. See, e.g., Richard Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment
Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1255 (1998) (defendants who agree to par-
ticipate in treatment court "effectively forego the presumption of innocence and the
panoply of trial rights guaranteed by the Constitution").
In fact, drug court clients typically sign forms waiving a host of constitutional
rights in order to participate in a drug court, including the right to trial by
jury, the right to a speedy trial, the right to a preliminary hearing, and the
requirement of probable cause for a search and seizure.
Nolan, supra note 93, at 1559.
146. Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 111, at 135.
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Court in New York City.' 47 While those results may lead to the
conclusion that problem-solving courts are no more coercive than
the vanguard Criminal Courts, that is, at best, cold comfort.
Surely, not even the most avid proponent of problem-solving
courts can take comfort in the knowledge that plea rates are com-
parable to what has been aptly described as a "plea mill.' 148
That highlights a fundamental problem. Problem-solving courts
simply do not address police accountability which is, for many, the
main "problem" confronting the Criminal Court. A look back at
the stop-and-frisk controversy occasioned by the shooting of Ama-
dou Diallo serves to underscore the seriousness of the problem of
unexamined police behavior. According to the "stop and frisk"
forms filled out by police officers, approximately eighty percent of
those stopped and frisked were either mistakenly or improperly
stopped. 49 In fact, the numbers are much greater. As New York's
Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, observed,
I've spoken to many officers who say that they do not fill out the
forms... for every stop-and-frisk, and that they may fill out, at
most, 1 in 5, or 1 in 10. In which case we may have had several
hundred thousand stops-and-frisks, with only the five to ten
thousand arrests, in which case the ratio would become that
much more overwhelming .... 150
The further recognition that the victims of this rampant stop-and
frisk practice were overwhelmingly young black and Latino men
led him to conclude that police searches were "the most serious
civil rights issue.., facing the city."'' That is indeed a "problem";
a huge problem. Communities of color are under siege. In a series
of interviews with more than forty black and Latino residents of
Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick, a reporter found that "[a]ll but
a handful of those interviewed said they or a relative had been
stopped for questioning by the police.' '1 52
What is the court's response to this problem? Problem-solving
courts, for all the good they can do, do not address this "most seri-
147. See Feinblatt et al., supra note 132, at 33 (citing MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL.,
DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFEcrs OF THE MID-
TOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000)).
148. See id. at 31.
149. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
150. Richard Perez-Pena, Police May Have Understated Street Searches, Spitzer
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, at B5.
151. Id.
152. Jim Yardley, In 2 Minority Neighborhoods, Residents See a Pattern of Hostile
Street Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3.
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ous civil rights issue." No doubt the failure of the courts to con-
front police behavior is part of the reason that poll after poll,
survey after survey, finds that people of color have much less faith
in the courts than do whites.153 That, too, is a problem the courts
must address.
While problem-solving may well be therapeutic for the commu-
nity, and even the accused, does it address concerns about inno-
cence, racially motivated arrests, and police falsifications?
Shouldn't courts be investigating more cases? Shouldn't courts be
holding more suppression hearings and more trials? Instead, it
seems that problem-solving courts, with their emphasis on sentenc-
ing and treatment, further imbed a culture of pleas and blind faith
in police activity. By focusing on "helping" the accused, and often
"demanding" guilty pleas in the process, these courts serve ironi-
cally to better insulate police falsifications from ever coming to the
surface.
The Mollen Commission's second category of police falsification
is called "documentary perjury"-where an officer swears falsely
under oath in an affidavit or criminal complaint.154 Once again,
police engage in this form of corruption because they know they
can, and do, get away with it. In 2004, more than 190,000 people
were arrested on misdemeanor charges in New York City. 55 The
overwhelming majority were people of color.156 Factor in growing
concerns about innocence and the ever present specter of police
corruption and it becomes clear that judges must meaningfully re-
view the pleadings as early as possible.
In People v. Dumas,'57 the Court of Appeals of New York
stressed that a misdemeanor complaint must allege "facts of an evi-
dentiary character"'158 demonstrating "reasonable cause" to believe
the accused committed the crime charged.15 9 The complaints at is-
sue contained merely conclusory statements and were dismissed as
facially insufficient. The court emphasized the critical nature of the
reasonable cause determination by pointing out that a misde-
meanor complaint can serve as the basis for an arrest warrant, and
153. See, e.g., David B. Rottman, Public Perceptions of the State Courts: A Primer,
15 CT. MANAGER 9, 13-14 (2000).
154. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 36.
155. DCJS e-mail, supra note 2.
156. See, e.g., CJA Research Brief, supra note 6, at 4 (eighty-four percent of those
arrested for non-felonies in 1998 were African-American or Latino).
157. 497 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1986).
158. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 100.15(3) (McKinney 2005).
159. Id. § 100.40(4)(b).
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is designed to provide the court with sufficient facts to decide
whether the accused should be held for further proceedings. 6 °
Given the consequences that can flow from a misdemeanor com-
plaint, it is entirely appropriate that it be comprised of evidentiary
facts instead of conclusory statements.
Just one year later, the court applied the logic of Dumas to "in-
formations."'' The court held that an information must demon-
strate both "reasonable cause" and a legally sufficient or prima
facie case. 1 2 As revealed by Judge Bellacosa in his concurring
opinion, the court was well aware of the impact of its holding and
the "practicalities encountered in prosecuting the relatively greater
numbers of these relatively less serious crimes, ' but the need for
specific factual allegations was seen as necessary "so that such
prosecutions do not become routinized or treated by anyone as in-
significant or unimportant.' 64 Amazingly, the call for accusatory
instruments with evidentiary facts has simply spawned a slew of
accusatory instruments containing remarkably similar, canned lan-
guage. This is evidenced by complaints charging misdemeanor
drug possession in New York City courts, 65 often with similar con-
cluding paragraphs extolling the officer's experience and training
regarding narcotics, regardless of whether it is the officer's first or
one-hundredth drug case. Judges must avoid lapsing into perfunc-
tory review of sufficiency and reasonable cause, and their critical
scrutiny of the accusatory instrument should take place at the
arraignment. 66
160. Dumas, 497 N.E.2d at 687.
161. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 100.15.
162. People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71, 73 (N.Y. 1987).
163. Id. at 75 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2003).
166. While many judges decline to hear oral sufficiency challenges at arraignments,
it seems apparent that, not only should they entertain such motions, they are in fact
obligated to do so. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.45; People v. Hernandez, 770
N.E.2d 566, 566 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Machado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (Crim. Ct.
1999). The Constitution mandates that a reasonable cause determination be made by
a judge "promptly" after a defendant has been arrested without a warrant. Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (persons
arrested must be arraigned without unnecessary delay); County of Riverside v. Mc-
Laughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-57 (1991) (a probable cause determination coupled with
arraignment must generally take place within forty-eight hours of arrest); People ex
rel. Maxian v. Brown, 568 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (App. Div. 1990), affd, 77 N.Y.2d 422
(1991) (a delay of more than twenty-four hours between arrest and arraignment is
presumptively unreasonable).
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Falsifying records, primarily police reports, is the third category
of police falsification.'67 The judiciary can best police this form ofcorruption by monitoring discovery practice. 16 8 The criminal dis-
covery procedure embodied in Article 240 was enacted almosttwenty-five years ago, and was intended to promote the greater,
freer, and earlier exchange of information between the parties.169
As the court stated in People v. Copicotto,170 the discovery statute
evinces a legislative determination that the trial of a criminalcharge should not be a sporting event where each side remainsignorant of facts in the hands of the adversary until events un-fold at trial. Broader pretrial discovery enables the defendant tomake a more informed plea decision, minimizes the tactical andoften unfair advantage to one side, and increases to some degreethe opportunity for an accurate determination of guilt or
innocence. 171
Discovery has evolved into a series of form filings, responses, anddecisions. Judges should invest in discovery so that it meets itslofty ideals as to what must be turned over, 172 when it must beturned over,17 3 and sanctions against the prosecutor for failing to
turn it over.174
167. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 36.
168. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20. Since there is no constitutional right to pre-trial discovery, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), public policy considera-tions figure prominently. New York also statutorily prescribes a practice for bills ofparticular. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.95. According to the practice commentaries,[t]he function of a bill of particulars is to "define more specifically the crime
or crimes charged.., or, in other words, to provide clarification" by furnish-ing information as to the substance of the factual allegations. Thus its officeis to give the defendant information regarding the circumstances underlying
the accusation, or its context, so that the defendant understands precisely
what it is he or she is to defend against.
Peter Preiser, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.95, Practice Commentaries.
169. See, e.g., James A. Yates, Discovery Provision is Misunderstood, N.Y. L.J., Oct.14, 2003, at 2 ("As one of the principals involved in the drafting of Article 240, I feelcompelled to point out that Article 240 was intended to advance, not restrict,
discovery.").
170. 406 N.E.2d 465, 468 (N.Y. 1980).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 64, at 496-97; Yates, supra note 169 (discussing
the court's discretionary authority to order discovery).173. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 73, at 792 ("[J]udges often allow prosecutors to
skirt their responsibility to turn over timely discovery .... ").174. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40. See BRAD MIDDLEKAUFF, CRIMINAL Dis-
COVERY IN NEW YORK STATE: A REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
CODES COMMITTEE 58 (1992) (discussing, inter alia, the use of sanctions for discoveryviolations). Inadequate pretrial discovery has many other adverse consequences. See
e.g., Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to
Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097
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The judiciary has at its disposal several other mechanisms to help
detect falsifications in police reports. In Brady v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a due process
right to disclosure of evidence favorable to him and material to
guilt or punishment.'75 New York courts have often found greater
protection for defendants on Brady-related claims than that
granted by the federal courts.176 Subpoenas provide another ave-
nue for prying loose police reports that might contain lies.177 While
there is no constitutional right to subpoena government docu-
ments, 78 trial judges do indeed have the discretionary authority to
issue subpoenas duces tecum.179 New York's Freedom of Informa-
tion Law ("FOIL") was enacted to provide the public with access
to government records.' 80 While the applicability of FOIL to
pending criminal cases has generated much debate and litigation,
the time is ripe for judges to reconsider FOIL requests as appropri-
ate in particular cases.' 8'
The usual objection to expanded discovery devices is administra-
tive. The police department, in particular, objects that it cannot
function under the weight of too many subpoenas and FOIL re-
quests. 82 Should the courts be more concerned with police depart-
ment complaints about a plethora of paperwork, or with making
sure that every litigated case is free from corruption? Again, the
Mollen Commission and the history of police scandals speak di-
rectly to that question. How better to track down falsifications in
(2004) (discussing how insufficient discovery, and the corresponding inability to fully
investigate, leads to ineffective assistance of counsel).
175. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
176. See Abraham Abramovsky, Pretrial 'Brady' Disclosure in N.Y, N.Y. L.J., Nov.
30, 2001, at 3 (regarding New York courts finding greater rights for defendants with
respect to the timing and scope of Brady disclosures); see also People v. Vilardi, 555
N.E.2d 915, 919 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Novoa, 517 N.E.2d 219, 223 (N.Y. 1987).
177. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 610.
178. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
179. See, e.g., People v. Bagley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 2001) (finding
that the defendant must provide a factual predicate that the documents sought would
bear relevant and exculpatory evidence); Yates, supra note 169.
180. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 2005). For illustrative purposes see
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
181. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc'y v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App.
Div. 2000); Gould v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 675 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1996) (finding
that the police department's "complaint follow-up report" was not entitled to blanket
protection under one of FOIL's enumerated exemptions).
182. See Jeremy Travis & Thomas P. Doepfner, Using Subpoenas to Obtain Police
Records, N.Y. L.J., May 21, 1993, at 1 (discussing the costs to the police department of
judicial subpoenas duces tecum).
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police reports than by making them available to the defense and
the subject of thorough and probing cross-examination?
The prosecutor's special role is to seek justice, not merely con-
victions. 83 Where was, and is, the prosecutor in this tale of ram-pant police falsification? How do prosecutors identify police
perjury? What do they do when a police officer is found to be
incredible? The fact is, a subsequent prosecution for perjury is al-together rare. 184 The anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors
often ignore manifestations of police corruption. 85 In the course
of ascribing blame and fault for flourishing police falsifications, the
Mollen Commission added,
Officers and their immediate supervisors are not the only cul-
prits in tolerating falsifications ... the Department's top com-manders must share the blame. Members of the lawenforcement community, and particularly defense attorneys,told us that this same tolerance is sometimes exhibited amongprosecutors. Indeed, several former and current prosecutors ac-knowledged-"off the record"-that perjury and falsifications
183. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor's] interest,therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shallbe done."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1998) ("A prosecutorhas the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.");
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrY EC 7-13 (1981) ("The responsibility of apublic prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice,not merely to convict."); AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty of the prosecu-tor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpabil-
ity and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 129 n.17 (1998); Bruce A.Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice," 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 643(1999).
184. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 49, at 1313 ("Occasionally police officers are prose-cuted for perjury, and from time to time they are punished. These cases are unusual,however, and undoubtedly represent only a fraction of the cases in which perjury hasoccurred."); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 ("Thepoliceman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he
is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven.").
185. The Mollen Commission reported about a practice referred to as "collars-for-
dollars." Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 39. This scheme involved officers makingunlawful arrests timed conveniently to generate overtime pay for the arresting officer.
Id. According to the Commission, this practice was "widely known to officers, policesupervisors, and prosecutors alike." Id.; see also Rosanna Cavallaro, Police andThieves, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1448 (1998) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIR-
TUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1996)) (assertingthat the prosecutors who worked with the corrupt officers "demonstrated a level of
knowledge that amounts to complicity").
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are serious problems in law enforcement that, though not con-
doned, are ignored.' 86
How did the District Attorneys respond to the knowledge that
they were apparently regularly played like fools, or worse, ex-
posed? When the nature and extent of police falsifications began
to surface, the District Attorney of Brooklyn called the problem"significant," and his counterpart in Queens termed it "terribly
troublesome."' 87 What sort of post-hoc grand rounds did they en-
gage in to see how they missed all the testilying, reportilying, and
related falsifications? What do they now do differently as a re-
sult? 188 How have they incorporated the lessons of the Mollen
Commission into their training about police credibility and the
need for prosecutors to critically, and even skeptically, evaluate po-
lice officers' accounts of arrests?
These are critical questions. The prosecutor, after all, serves as
the frontline or the gatekeeper to the criminal court. It is the pros-
ecutor who interviews the arresting officer and decides whether to
initiate criminal proceedings. 89 The prosecutor's decision to file a
criminal court accusatory instrument represents some form of
vouching for the arresting officer. Their ability, and willingness,19°
to carefully and accurately discern truth and ferret out lies is of
paramount concern. 19' Yet, administrative changes over the years
have served to distance prosecutors from arresting officers, thereby
making it that much harder to assess credibility. It was once stan-
dard practice for the arresting officer to be interviewed by a prose-
cutor in-person shortly after the arrest. Today, more and more, the
interview is conducted over the phone or through videoconferenc-
186. Mollen Report, supra note 39, at 41-42; see Sexton, supra note 81 ("'No one
looks down on it,' said one former prosecutor in Manhattan, who asked to remain
anonymous. 'Taking money is considered dirty, but perjury for the sake of an arrest is
accepted."').
187. Sexton, supra note 81.
188. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police
Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 305, 308 (2001) (discuss-
ing what the prosecutors could have done to better prevent the police scandal in Los
Angeles, and what they should do in the future to prevent such abuses).
189. Id. at 305 ("Prosecutors are thus in a unique role to oversee and monitor the
conduct of the police.").
190. Id. at 310 (addressing the reluctance of some prosecutors to challenge police
officers' accounts of the arrest).
191. Id. at 316 (arguing that prosecutors have a responsibility to "question and
evaluate" police officers' credibility, especially since so many cases are resolved with-
out a trial).
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ing. 192 As a result, the possibility of being trained to look for so-
called telltale signs of lying (i.e., shifting in the seat; averting one's
eyes; etc.) is rendered meaningless. 193
Other actions by prosecutors have the effect of making it harder,rather than easier, to detect police falsification. The New York
State District Attorney's Association, in conjunction with the NewYork State Law Enforcement Council ("LEC"), has labored might-
ily to restrict the flow of information to the defense. As discussed
above, New York's Freedom of Information Law provides publicaccess to government records. 194 The LEC has supported legisla-
tion that exempts law enforcement agency records relating topending criminal cases from FOIL.19 If passed, this legislation
would close a potential path to the discovery of police falsification.
In People v. Ranghelle, the Court of Appeals held that reversal was
the appropriate remedy whenever the prosecution failed to dis-
close any prior statements of a witness who testified at trial. 196 The
192. See, e.g., Bill Farrell, A New Arrest Process, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 1995, at 2;Joseph P. Fried, TV Speeds Cases From Police to Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,1995, at B4 ("[v]ideo teleconferencing is about efficiency, processing arrests and re-turning police officers to the street as quickly as possible," quoting then Police Com-missioner William J. Bratton); Bob Kappstatter, BLAP! Bronx Cops Fight Time,
DAILY NEWS, July 21, 1995, at 2; Leonard Rubin, PC-Based Video Provides MoreBang for the Buck, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1995, at S2; Chuck Sudetic, Plan Streamlines
Booking in 14 Brooklyn Precincts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at B2 ("[w]e all used tothink you had to see a police officer and a victim sitting across a table," quoting an
assistant district attorney).
193. This is but another example of the ways the Criminal Court emphasizes effi-
ciency at the expense of truthseeking. Not that long ago, the arresting officer had tospeak with a prosecutor face-to-face, and also had to appear in court at the arraign-ment. See, e.g., E.R. Shipp, Prearraignment System to be Used by Morgenthau, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1982, at 32. !n both situations, the officer was subject to being ques-tioned about the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Id. As we move closer to aform of virtual justice, the arresting officer becomes increasingly insulated from any
meaningful questioning about his or her behavior. In similar fashion, "[m]ost assis-tant district attorneys do not appear in court to 'cover' their cases; rather the day'sdocket is handled by ADAs assigned to a courtroom part who rely on written instruc-tions provided by the ADA assigned to each respective case." Rayner, supra note 1,at 1063 n.79. This practice of prosecution by note often deprives the court and de-fense counsel of vital information during case conferences, and also distances theprosecutor from the accused; it is not uncommon for a prosecutor to never actually
see the person she is prosecuting.
194. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
195. N.Y. State Law Enforcement Council, 1998 Legislative Priorities 37 (1998).
196. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.44, 240.45 (McKinney 2005); 503 N.E.2d 1011(N.Y. 1986); see Mark M. Baker, The 'Rosario' Per Se Rule: Rest in Peace, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 14, 2001, at 1 (automatic reversal was the remedy if the prosecutor failed todisclose prior statements, memoranda, or other materials in their possession relating
to the subject matter of the witness's testimony).
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LEC steadfastly and aggressively advocated for the legislation that
overruled Ranghelle by removing the automatic reversal remedy
and substituting a harmless error analysis. 197
Putting aside the question of whether the Ranghelle rule did in
fact result in many reversals, it is important to examine the impact
of the rule. Given the fear of an automatic reversal, one would
imagine that prosecutors were more diligent than ever before to
track down and disclose every document connected to the case.
What better way to uncover the existence of falsified reports? The
prosecutors took a similar tack with respect to subpoenas, and
joined with the police department in a concerted effort to reduce
the numbers of judicial subpoenas duces tecum. 198 As a result of
these policies, police reports remain buried, far away from the light
of day.
Prosecutors must also reconsider the role of the guilty plea. Poli-
cies or practices that effectively punish defendants for litigating
suppression issues and/or culpability result in overwhelming num-
bers of guilty pleas. 199 These pleas, in turn, result in unchecked,
unmonitored police activity. As part of their justice-seeking func-
tion, prosecutors should endeavor to expose police actions to scru-
tiny from judges and juries.
Prosecutorial attitudes about the Criminal Court should reflect
the seriousness of the charges for the accused, especially in the cur-
rent climate where far-reaching collateral consequences attach to
almost all convictions. 2' A former New York City Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney described how early in his career a supervisor ad-
vised him to calm down because he was "only dealing with
misdemeanors." 20 1 That same former prosecutor writes that "[t]he
197. See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Open Discovery Law Seen as Separate Issue, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 16, 1996, at 2 ("For the past eight years the District Attorneys' Association
has sought legislation to overrule the decision[s] in People v. Ranghelle ... failure to
turn over any prior written or recorded statement of a witness at trial is per se revers-
ible error."). In 2000, the legislature eliminated the so-called Ranghelle rule. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75 (effective 2/1/01).
198. See Travis & Doepfner, supra note 182 ("Over the past few years, the [police]
department has pursued an aggressive litigation program, in cooperation with the Dis-
trict Attorney's offices, in an attempt to reduce the number of inappropriately issued
subpoenas.").
199. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Judges also use the threat of a
higher sentence to disincline defendants from litigating their cases. Id.
200. See, e.g., INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
201. Heilbroner, supra note 58, at 26.
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stakes for misdemeanants were never high. 20 2 Putting to the side
the insensitivity and arrogance of those remarks, one can only hope
that prosecutors currently appreciate the havoc that misdemeanor
arrests can wreak on people's lives. It is not uncommon for thelow-level, quality-of-life offense to lead to draconian sanctions
ranging from deportation to eviction from public housing. °3
One commentator argues that the ethical lens has been pointed
at the defense bar for too long, and he advocates turning it in thedirection of the prosecution. 0° Others suggest, similarly, that it is
appropriate to demand greater ethical conduct from prosecutors.2 °5
As one leading authority stated, as "a minister of justice to protect
innocent persons from wrongful convictions," the prosecutor has"a duty to make an independent evaluation of the credibility of hiswitnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and the truth of the
defendant's guilt" beyond that mandated by the ethical rules.20 6 To
date, prosecutors have been relatively free from oversight or criti-
cal review.21 7 There are very few cases where disciplinary authori-ties have sanctioned prosecutors.0 8 It is also rare for appellate
courts to reverse convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct.0 9
Apparently, prosecutors are also rarely disciplined within their
own offices, even when an appellate court has found that they
withheld exculpatory evidence.2 a0
It seems to be the case that prosecutors, as well as judges, are not
simply oblivious to police falsifications. Rather, they are also too
willing to turn a blind eye in that direction. As one commentator
202. Id. at 51. That attitude might explain the practice of a supervisor who "regu-
larly called emergency meetings of the rookies at which he pressed us to requesthigher bail and make fewer plea-bargains, since the statistics were down." Id. at 62.
203. See, e.g., Rayner, supra note 1, at 1049.
204. Dershowitz, supra note 49, at 20.
205. Green, supra note 79, at 1576.
206. Gershman, supra note 79, at 337.
207. Gary C. Williams, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System;Incubating Monsters?: Prosecutorial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 829, 837 n.44 (2001).
208. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 393, 454(1992); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV.
721, 722 (2001).
209. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 862 (1995) ("The prosecutor's [exercise of discretion] is effectively unreviewable
by courts.").
210. See, e.g., Andrea Elliott, Prosecutors Not Penalized, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TiMES,Dec. 17, 2003, at B1; Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err,Others Pay the Price; Disciplinary Action is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at 25.
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asked rhetorically, "Is it possible that hundreds of thousands of
transparent cases of police perjury are occurring every year in the
courts of this country without prosecutors and judges knowing
about it, and even encouraging it? I don't think so."'211 If indeed
those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it,212
then the Criminal Court must address the recurring, systemic prob-
lem of police falsification quickly. After all, we are already ten
years into the next cycle.
211. Dershowitz, supra note 49, at 17; see Slobogin, supra note 48, at 1046 (refer-
ring to a study finding "stunning evidence of prosecutorial and judicial nonchalance");
Chase, supra note 49, at 775 (stating need to "encourage prosecutors and judges to be
more critical in their evaluation of police officer accounts of their criminal
investigations").
212. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN
COMMON SENSE 284 (Charles Scribner's Sons 2d ed. 1936) (1905) ("Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.").
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